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Abstract
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) argue for alternative behavioral guidelines than those currently being
used in many social justice courses. Their alternative is to silence or constrain privileged voices so that
marginalized voices have ample space to be heard and taken seriously. This raises the concern that
silencing any group of persons runs too great a risk of alienating them to the point where their mistrust of the “other” is exacerbated rather than assuaged. This response suggests that, instead of silencing or even constraining privileged voices in the classroom, we may want to move toward developing
in students the attitude that all claims and assertions, especially those that society often accepts as true
without question, must undergo critical scrutiny. If we can teach students that a well-informed belief
is one that is continually subject to critical analysis, and we can guide them in developing and understanding that our social positionality leads us to favor certain views and perspectives over others due,
in large part, to the inequity in our social structures, perhaps we can open our students’ minds to the
value and worth of marginalized claims and views.

This article is a response to:

S

Sensoy, Ö. and DiAngelo, R. (2014). Respect differences? Challenging the common guidelines in
social justice education. Democracy & Education, 22(2), Article 1. Available online at:
http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol22/iss2/1/

ensoy and DiAngelo (2014) argue that the behavioral guidelines used in many social justice courses to
help ensure fairness and equality of opportunity in classroom discussions actually help maintain unjust power relations
that privilege the dominant and silence the oppressed. Their
examples illustrate how such guidelines can have the opposite effect
they intended. While I sympathize and agree with much of what the
authors claim, I have some concerns. Instead of silencing or even
constraining privileged voices in the classroom, we may want to
move toward developing in students the attitude that all beliefs and
assertions, especially those that society often accepts as true
without question, must be backed up with good reasons, evidence,
and arguments.
According to Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014), the commonly
used classroom guidelines in social justice courses “increase
unequal power relations in the classroom” rather than create “an
equitable and open classroom space” (p. 2). In their experience as
social justice educators, they
have found it helpful to strategically constrain several of the most
commonsense community-building guidelines including: sharing
opinions, affirming everyone’s perspectives, assuring everyone feels
democracy & education, vol 22, n-o 2

heard, eliciting personal connections and feelings about the course
material and emotional responses to course texts, co-constructing the
curriculum, and sharing airtime. (p. 2).

They claim that those who enjoy privilege in mainstream
society by having their voices heard and beliefs count more than
the marginalized ought not to enjoy such privilege in their classrooms. Instead, their dominant perspectives and claims ought to be
limited. Just how limited, we are not told. But we can assume that it
is enough to allow those who are typically silenced to express their
beliefs and discuss their experiences in a space where their comments will be heard.
In their paper, Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) provide an
example where a student told an invited panel member that she did
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not appreciate being asked to accept homosexuality because she
believes such a “lifestyle” to be immoral (p. 3). Sensoy and
DiAngelo argue that allowing such comments “reinforce problematic discursive effects by legitimizing the idea that the conversation
is equalizing only when it also includes dominant voices” (p. 3).
Advocating that all views be given a voice is not, however, just an
attempt at “fairness” (p. 3), as Sensoy and DiAngelo claim. Rather,
it can be attempt at developing “critical spaces” (Giroux, 1983) that
teach students to deliberate critically about beliefs often held as
unquestionably true without considering the arguments and
evidence against such beliefs.
Restricting dominant views is risky. While it certainly has its
benefits, as explicated by Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014), it legitimizes the practice of teachers deciding which perspectives,
ideologies, and attitudes to allow in class and which to silence.
This sounds too much like teachers of more mainstream courses
silencing marginalized voices or privileging the views of the
dominant voices in society. Both are cases in which the teacher
controls the political debate in the classroom and helps shape the
attitudes and perspectives taken in class discussions. Neither
allows students the opportunity to, or teaches them to, effectively
address sensitive and controversial issues, nor do they help
students work through the very real ignorance, bias, and discrimination that exists in their beliefs about themselves and others.
In my experience as a high school teacher, when people such as
White, successful students, who are accustomed to having their
assertions taken seriously in class, are ignored or made to feel their
beliefs are morally suspect, they quickly learn to play by the rules of
the teacher. As one student told me, they learn to say in class that all
White men are bad and women and natives are good so that they
can get a good grade. When privileged voices are silenced in class,
those students who enjoy such privilege in society may not, as
Sensoy and DiAngelo hope, come to see that their views ought to
be altered. Rather, they may learn that they ought to wait to express
their views outside of the class where the vast majority in society
will support them.
Yet, Sensoy and DiAngelo’s (2014) claims cannot be so easily
dismissed. By opening the debate of whether same-sex relationships ought to be given equal rights and privileges in society as
heterosexual relationships, we risk putting the worth of gays,
lesbians, homosexuals, and bisexuals into question. Similarly, if we
allow debate on women’s equality to men, we risk putting women’s
worth into question. No student should be put into the position of
having to defend worth as a human being. Doing so not only has
significant moral concerns but epistemic ones as well. Students
who are presumed inferior until they can prove otherwise are not
given an equal voice in class; their comments are not taken as
seriously or as “true” as those offered by privileged students.
As liberal democratic and critical theorists argue, schools
often mirror structural inequalities found in society that unfairly
privilege some voices over others (Fletcher, 2000, pp. 50–57).
Allowing such comments that question the worth of people in class
would appear to further entrench this unjust privileging. In short, if
we encourage or even consent to having our students question, for
example, women’s worth, we may help perpetuate the unjust
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silencing of women’s voices and thus help to maintain their
oppression in schools and society.
However, taking questions about a person’s worth out of the
domain of school discussions does not permit sexist, racist,
homophobic, and otherwise prejudiced views to be challenged.
As Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) admit, critics of their views may ask
whether it is sometimes “important to surface these perspectives so
that they may be critically reflected upon” (p. 3). The authors’ answer is
threefold. First, they claim that marginalized voices need to be given
priority and sometimes exclusivity in order to help “dislodge” (p. 4)
the often unquestioned and pervasive dominant, mainstream views.
Second, because marginalized voices are typically ignored and
perceived as unworthy, privileged voices “can have the effect of
hijacking the discussion” (p. 4). Third, “institutional weight” (p. 4)
goes to the privileged views and thus they can, even if unintentionally,
silence the voices of the underprivileged.
While I agree that deeply embedded, structural bias significantly and unfairly favors dominant ideologies, I wonder if instead
of trying to be “fair” to all views, teachers should clearly name the
issue of unjust power hierarchies that exist in society and are
mirrored in schools. Granted, such naming comes with its own
difficulties as Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) point out (p. 3).
However, it seems to be less problematic than silencing a cultural
group’s voices.
What is needed, it seems, is a way to allow students to engage in
inquiry about, say, sex equality without putting women in the
position of having to defend their worth as human beings. It may be
helpful to note at this point that the question “Are women equal in
worth to men?” presupposes that men’s worth is unquestioned but
women’s worth is very much up for debate. Asking “Are women and
men equal?” however, does not make any such presuppositions. If we
permit students to talk about sexism, gender oppression, and the
worth of people, we do not necessarily put women’s worth into
question. Indeed, women’s studies courses engage students in such
conversations every day. Inquiring into beliefs about men’s superiority over women, if done skillfully, does not have to cause the further
entrenchment of women’s oppression. Educators must be sure to set
up class discussions in such a way that students can deliberate over
the equality between women and men without starting from the
assumption that women’s worth is disputable. In any dialectic
inquiry about sex equality, teachers need to ensure that their female
students’ contributions are considered as valuable as the contributions made by the male students. The skillful handling of classroom
conversations about equality (whether it be sex, race, etc.) does not
unduly jeopardize the value and worth of any student’s contributions
to the class discussion.
Unless we provide space for such claims to be critiqued in the
light of rational inquiry, there is little hope such beliefs will be
alterable even when there is adequate evidence against them.
Although the thought of people holding such views that question
the worth of people is repugnant to many, they are views that,
unfortunately, millions of people hold as true. Refusing to allow
students to voice their doubts about, say, the equality of women,
may teach them that such doubts are unwanted and undesirable in
a particular classroom. It does not, however, teach them that their
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beliefs are wrong. Airing oppressive beliefs in the open space of the
classroom, not in the interest of fairness but with the purpose of
teaching students to critically assess the worth of all claims, may
help diminish oppressive beliefs.
Perhaps an answer to providing marginalized voices in the
classroom an equitable role in class discussions is to teach students
that all beliefs ought to be subject to rational scrutiny. Paul (2002)
provides one theoretical framework in which teachers can formulate methods of engaging students in critical discussions of what
more liberal and progressive thinkers often see as racist, sexist, and
homophobic thinking. Paul claims that critical thinkers are not
characterized by the beliefs they hold but rather by how they hold
their beliefs. For Paul, to achieve confidence in our beliefs, we must
be ever open to re-assessing the epistemic worth of our beliefs from
various perspectives and worldviews and in light of all available
evidence and arguments. Indeed, he recommends that we seek out
and consider the best objection to our views.
Misak, a Peircean scholar, also offers a framework in which
educators can help ensure that oppressive beliefs and comments are
critically examined in classes, a worthy goal in social justice courses.
She agrees with Peirce’s dictum, Let nothing stand in the way of
inquiry. According to Misak (2004), people must hold beliefs open to
the experiences of all people. If people hold their beliefs in such a
way, then they are genuinely interested in arriving at beliefs that
would meet with all relevant experiences at the hypothetical end of
inquiry. Aiming to get the right answer, the answer that we would not
doubt at the end of the day, means not excluding anyone’s experiences that speak to a given belief. As Misak (2000) notes, “the
open-endedness of inquiry and the commitment to taking other
perspectives seriously must be preserved if we are to have any hope of
reaching beliefs which really do account for all experiences and
argument” (p. 97). Refusing to allow students to discuss particular
assertions implies that such assertions cannot be reasoned about and
implies that there may be some infallible source of truth somehow
beyond them that can easily be thought to be the text, the teacher, or
the state—probably whoever has the power to insist on them
learning such beliefs as truths. It risks undermining students’
capacities to engage in open-minded and critically deliberative
inquiry. Thus, although there are some issues that need to be handled
with great skill and care, to cultivate critically deliberative thinking
and to help students who hold harmful views about others challenge
their thinking in a real and meaningful way, educators should permit
and even encourage students to be open to inquiry.
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) are correct in being skeptical of
the guidelines that require all beliefs an equal amount of time and
worth. Such guidelines support not only deeply entrenched, unjust
social positioning but also supports lazy thinking. If students are
able to state their views without having the responsibility of defending them with what they learn to be good evidence, reasons, and
arguments, we risk teaching them that a subjective approach to
thinking is an adequate form of critical inquiry, that one opinion is
as good as another, and that assertions do not have to be critically
examined by reason, introspection, or mindful open reflection.
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) admit that “engaging constructively with alternative perspectives, thinking critically, . . . raising
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critical questions . . . [and] recognizing the power relations
embedded in positionality” (p. 7−8) are important components of
educating for social justice. Yet they argue that such capacities are
not developed using current teaching guidelines that give equal
time and value to all beliefs because privileged views will continue
to be privileged and will, in effect, silence voices too often silent.
Instead of following the guideline of equal time to all views,
perhaps we should follow what they themselves advocate toward
the end of their article. Teach students to: “Be willing to grapple
with challenging ideas . . . [and] recognize how your own social
positionality . . . informs your perspectives” (p. 8). These guidelines
seem to afford all students, even those who are privileged, a voice
while requiring them to critically examine not only the reasons for
their beliefs but where the beliefs come from, what assumptions are
associated with them, and how they may be altered in the face of an
open-minded analysis of opposing evidence.
While I agree with both the goals and the concerns Sensoy and
DiAngelo (2014) discuss in their article, I believe we can find an
alternative to silencing or constraining privileged voices, one that
meets our common goal of raising awareness of structural inequity
and working against oppression. Having critical thinking or
critically deliberative inquiry as our goal in social justice courses
with the pragmatic conception of knowledge as beliefs that meet
with all experiences, broadly construed, at the hypothetical end of
inquiry, we may not have to constrain any voices but require all
students to adopt the habit of engaging in analysis and open-
minded scrutiny of their beliefs, assumptions, positionality, and
biases. If we can teach students that a well-informed belief is one
that is continually subject to modification based on new and
conflicting evidence, and if we are careful to help them understand
that we all carry biases that unjustly favor certain views and
perspectives over others due, in large part, to the inequity in our
social structures, perhaps we can not only open their minds to the
value and worth of marginalized claims and views but teach them
to value certain ways of holding beliefs over stubbornly clinging to
unexamined assumptions and views. Silencing any group of
students runs too great a risk of alienating them. And constraining
the voice of the privileged seems to risk alienating the privileged to
the point where their mistrust of oppressed groups is exacerbated
rather than assuaged.
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